The study attempts to explore the relationship between risk governance structure and firm performance. In perhaps the first of its kind attempt, a normative framework for risk governance structures is being put forward. Based on the framework, an index indicating strength/quality of risk governance structures is proposed. Then, the impact of risk governance structure on firm performance is gauged. To this end, the study makes use of constituents of S&P CNX500 index and covers a ten year period from April 1, 2005 to March 31, 2015.To control for potential endogeneity among variables of interest, the study makes use of a robust and reliable methodology, 'difference-GMM'. In addition, to ensure completeness of results, the study employs control variables such as recession dummy, firm's age, size, and growth rate and leverage ratio. The results suggest that robust risk governance structures do not necessarily lead to better firm performance. In fact, risk governance index is negatively related to both ROA and ROE. The relationship is not statistically significant but has wide economic implications. A prominent implication being, mere constitution of risk management committee and appointment of CRO will not improve firm performance; regulators and companies need to ensure that governance structures are not too rigid, excessively risk averse and ineffective and inefficient in decision making. Given the simplicity and reliability of the proposed risk governance index, and the recommendations put forth in the paper, the study is expected to be of immense utility in an important yet neglected area of risk governance.
A number of studies document that certain governance structures may be drivers of firm performance, but these studies have been widely criticised as most of them tend to ignore potential endogeneities. Critics argue that there is a possibility (of reverse causality) that performance drives governance or some third unobservable factor influences both governance and performance (Wintoki, et al., 2012) . Recognising this (potential) endogenous nature of relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, Bhagat and Black (2002) , suggest unreliability of estimation techniques that overlook this pertinent issue. Following this stream of thought, Wintoki, et al. (2010) , advocate use of generalized method of moments (GMM), technique that is aptin dealing with endogeneity and simultaneity bias. Therefore, the study uses 'difference GMM' with control variables to gauge the relationship between risk governance structure and firm performance.
The paper has been organized into seven sections. Section 2 highlights relevance of risk governance. Section 3 describes the sample used and sources of data. Section 4 elaborates the methodology employed for index construction and for analysis. Section 5 examines the findings and presents the analysis of the same. This is followed by concluding observations.
Background and review of literature
With international organizations such as Financial Stability board (FSB, 2013) and Committee of Sponsoring Organization (COSO) (COSO,2013) focusing extensively on risk governance, it seems imperative to review that whether the structures based on recommendations provided in these guidelines are actually serving their intended purpose or not. These studies are particularly required for emerging countries (such as India and China) that are in transitory phase in terms of governance reforms. It will help policy makers and regulators in examining that whether the regulations are actually making any contribution or not and that whether the compliance with the regulations is a mere eyewash. Further, the concept of risk governance being a recent phenomenon is narrowly researched; whatever research exists is mainly for financial entities.
Corporate governance and firm performance is a widely researched phenomenon, with results ranging from positive association (Brookman and Thistle, 2009; Pan et al., 2013) to negative association (Bebchuk et al., 2009) . In fact few studies have documented no relation also. It is worth mentioning that not just corporate governance (Noor and Ayoub, 2009 ) and related measures, but also other firm specific factors like age, size, leverage (Mancinelli and Ozkan, 2006) , growth (Damodaran, 2006) , DPS (Kamunde, 2011) , etc. could be significant factors affecting firm performance.
In a recent study, Abu- Ghunmi et al. (2015) emphasized that corporate governance mechanisms not only affect firm performance but could provide plausible explanation for idiosyncratic risk also. Their arguments are in line with those of Baxter and Cotter (2009) and Davidson et al. (2005) , who evidenced that composition of audit committee and proportion of non-executive directors, are significant contributors towards improvement in earnings quality. In a similar study Huang and Wang (2015) emphasized the importance of board size for firms' riskiness.
Unlike most studies, that have linked specific governance indicators with firm's riskiness, Jiraporn et al. (2015) explored the relationship between governance and risk by using a composite governance indicator. They consider two contrasting hypothesis; first, risk-avoidance hypothesis and second, risk-seeking hypothesis. In the context of risk-avoidance view, they posit that weak governance structures result in lower risk taking. Pursuing the risk-seeking hypothesis Lee et al. (2006) suggest that better governance may reduce firm specific risks.
It is noteworthy that there are empirical evidences and studies focusing on corporate governance and risk, but, no particular study focusing on risk governance could be found. Also, in terms of corporate governance, the studies have either looked at specific governance mechanisms (like, CEO duality, board size, audit committee composition, etc.) or existing composite governance measures like GIM-index, developed by Gompers et al. (2003) .
It is pertinent to note, that corporate governance has varying definitions and encompasses a plethora of variables, whose relevance varies as per the context. In the context of risk and risk taking, focus needs to be put on a specialized subset of corporate governance, called risk governance. Risk governance has been defined as "the ways in which directors authorize, optimize, and monitor risk taking in an enterprise. It includes the skills, infrastructure (i.e., organization structure, controls and information systems), and culture deployed as directors exercise their oversight" (International Finance Corporation (IFC). Since, risk governance is the specialized arm of corporate governance that deals exclusively with risk and risk management, it appears reasonable to believe that the quality of governance structure would have an impact on the firm performance, which could be viewed as function of risk levels of the company.
In view of the above, the primary purpose of the paper is to explore the relation between risk governance structure and firm performance. In other words, study attempts to gauge whether better risk governance structure leads to better firm performance.
Sample
The sample consists of non-financial companies that constitute CNX 500 index as on March 31, 2014 
Methodology
The main objective of the paper is to gauge whether better risk governance structure leads to better firm performance. Therefore, as a first step, risk governance index (RGI) (which will be the independent variable) has been developed. The index is based on ninevariables, namely, size of board, board diversity in terms of gender, The rationale for each of the variable has been discussed below. 
Proportion of women directors on board (PoW) Score
No woman 1 0<PoW<1/3 ORPoW>1/2 2.5
PoW= 1/2 5 Table 2 . Scoring in relation to number of women directors on Board 
Status of Chairman Score
Executive Chairman 3
Non-executive Chairman 5 Table 4 . Scoring in relation to Executive-non executive status of Chairman
(5) Proportion of independent directors
Boyer and Stern (2012)depict independent Boards as a good governance feature and expect firms with more independent boards to pay a lower premium. Prior studies suggest that there are some positive shareholder outcomes associated with independent boards including lower instances of earnings manipulation and fraud (Dechow et al., 1996; and Klein, 2002) ; superior decision making (Dahya and McConnell, 2005) ; and greater levels of disclosure.
When the Chairman is an executive director
Proportion of independent directors on board (PoID) Score
PoID>1/2 5 Table 6 . Scoring in relation to proportion of independent directors, with non-executive Chairman
(6) CEO duality
When the CEO also serves as the Chairman of the Board, the board's ability to fulfil its supervisory function is significantly reduced due to conflict of interests (Brickley et al., 1997) . Further, Rechner & Dalton (1991) suggest absence of CEO duality facilitates effective monitoring of the activities of top management and results in reduction in agency costs. Therefore, CEO non-duality is often preferred for strategic as well as operational reasons.
CEO duality Score

Yes 3
No 5
Exhibit 7. Scoring in context of CEO duality 
Implemented a Whistle blower Score
No 1
Yes 5 Table 9 . Scoring in context of existence of a whistle blower policy as Phase II (post-recession period). A dummy variable has been used for the purpose.
Age-Abernathy and Utterback (1978) have highlighted the significance of firms' lifecycle on strategic decisions.
They suggest that younger firms have limited knowledge base and that is reflected in their governance structures.
Whereas, certain other studies show that older firms exhibit rent seeking behaviour and poorer corporate governance.
Further, Firm age has been linked to strategic decisions of the firm and it has been observed that complexity increases with firm age. The number of years the firm has been in existence since its inception , has been taken as the proxy for firm age.
Firm size-The effect of firm size on governance is ambiguous (Klapper and Love, 2004) . It is suggested that large firms may have severe agency problems and therefore need to compensate with stricter governance mechanisms.
Alternatively, small firms may have better growth opportunities and greater need for external finance, leading to better governance mechanisms. Natural log of total assets has been used to proxy size (Akbar et al 2016).
Growth-Studies havesuggested that growth rate/ growth opportunities available to a company may affect its performance. Similarly, Durnev and Kim (2003) show that growing companies, tend to exhibit higher returns to various stakeholders.Therefore, it is imperative to control for growth of company.
Leverage-Traditionally, financing pattern of a company has been viewed as a significant determiner of firm performance. The capital structure of a firm is expected to have an impact on performance, as the pecking order theory suggests a negative relation between corporate profitability and debt ratios (Fama and French, 2002). Concepts including 'trading on equity' are often employed to magnify returns for a particular group of stakeholders (Khan and Jain, 2014).
Dependent variables
Firm performance could be measured using either accounting measures or market based measures or both. The study uses accounting based measures only, as stock market based measures like stock returns could be unduly affected by investor perception (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) . Return on Equity (ROE)-It helps to gauge profitability from owners/ equity shareholders' point of view (Zabria, et al., 2016) . ROE is a widely accepted measure of performance (Johnson and Greening, 1999) .
Return on assets (ROA)-
Variable
Measure used
Risk governance index (RGI) Based on normative described in Section 4
Return on assets (ROA) Net profit after taxes + Interest/ Total assets argue that firm performance and corporate governance are simultaneously determined by unobservable firm-specific factors, and that governance changes are determined by past, present and/or expected characteristics of the firm.
Hence, given the panel nature of data and following past studies, the study proposes to use 'difference GMM' for estimating various relationships.
Empirical evidence
It is evident from Table 2 that the mean index score for the period of study is about 65 per cent; this may be attributed to increased focus on corporate governance and risk management. Further, the index score in the range of about 65% per cent is indicative of most (governance) parameters being in the range of 3 to 4 (out of 5) each. In other words, on an average, Indian companies have a near ideal index, based on the normative framework developed above.
In addition, a low standard deviation in the range of 8-9 per cent is suggestive of somewhat similar structures in majority of companies.In sum, the Indian corporate sector appears to be mindful of the benefits of strong governance structure. They seem to have the belief that it's the governance structure and mechanism that will enable companies to manage risks, endure difficulties and leverage the opportunities. It is worth mentioning that few control variables such as age of firm, size of firm and period of recession seem to have a statistically significant impact on ROA of Indian firms. On one hand as the firms survive more years they tend to gain more operating efficiency, on the other hand, as firms increase in size, they tend to exhibit lower ROA. Further, recession seems to have adversely affected the firms' capacity to generate ROA. Table 4 reveals that current levels of return on shareholders' equity are significantly and positively affected by ROE observed in immediately preceding previous year. Surprisingly, there is a negative relationship between risk governance index and ROE. This implies that better the governance structure, lower the returns generated on funds provided by equity shareholders. Though this relationship, like that of ROA and governance structures, is not statistically significant, it has extensive economic implications. The negative relationship seems to suggest that may be the governance structures though strong, prima facie, are too rigid. These structures are probably acting as impediments to effective and efficient decision-making; they seem to be facilitating acceptance of safer non-yielding alternatives over that of risky but rewarding opportunities. In other words, these structures appear to propagate the culture of risk avoidance, possibly leading to passing-on of risky yet potentially rewarding projects. The results are similar to that of Similarly, in terms of size, bigger firms seem to have higher ROE than smaller firms. Further growth and leverage are negatively related to ROE. Just as in the case of ROA, recession has had a negative impact on ROE as well.
These surprising yet interesting findings call for a review of policies (regulatory), policies those prima facie seem to strengthen risk governance structures and facilitate effective and efficient decision making but, in reality fail to yield the desired/intended results.
Concluding observations
Literature is rife with corporate governance studies and various versions of corporate governance index are available. But, construction of a risk governance index (as proposed in this study) is perhaps the first of its kind attempt.
Indian companies have decent risk management structure with mean index scores of about 65 per cent. The general view is that a good risk governance structure is pertinent for effective and efficient risk management and better firm performance, but, results indicate the contrary. To overcome the problem of endogeneity and simultaneity bias the relationship between governance structure and firm performance has been gauged using a robust estimation technique, 'difference GMM'. The results show that booth ROA and ROE are negatively related to risk governance index, indicating that better the governance structure, poorer the firm performance. This is suggestive of rigid structures and/or inefficient decision making. Regulators need to take cognizance of the fact that mere constitution of risk management committee or appointment of a CRO is not going to ensure better risk management and improved firm performance.
Directors and CRO and risk management committee should be competent and effective.
It is noteworthy that both ROA and ROE are significantly affected by the respective measures of immediately preceding previous year. Further, firms' age, size, growth rate, leverage ratio and recession affect ROA and ROE in varying degrees.
In addition,the study is believed to have important implications for regulators, investors as well as for management of companies.
In sum, better governance structures do not necessarily ensure better risk management and improved firm performance.
